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Ideology ~  a Static Definition 
of Reality
IDEOLOGY HAS BEEN APPROACHED from two perspectives, 
the first treats the concept neutrally as the mode of organisation 
of perceptual information (external reality, including ideas) while 
the second treats ideology within the framework of an objective 
reality that is knowable, ideology being seen as a distortion of 
this reality.
Weber1 can be approached as a representative of the first school 
of thought —  ideology is viewed as a system of beliefs about 
reality, ethically neutral, held either individually or by a group. 
Weber sees ideas coalescing around interests via ‘elective affinity’ 
but has no systematic theory of ideology. The relationship of ideas 
and beliefs to particular social characteristics is placed in a value- 
free context. Weber identifies particular ideas that are congruent 
with particular social formations (e.g. the protestant ethic and 
capitalism) but there is no value judgement placed on the content 
consciousness (language) and may serve as a brake to consciousness.
1 A lthough W eber has no explic it theory of 'ideology', because th e  developm ent 
of his notion of the  in te rp lay  betw een ‘ideal and m ateria l in terests’ has been 
described as a ‘dialogue w ith  M arx’s ghost’ (a dialogue particu larly  with the 
ghost's notion of ideology), followers of W eber have regarded him  as having 
reform ulated  the  theory of ideology. T h u s W eber’s ‘theory of ideology’ may be 
found in  his discussions of th e  re la tion  betw een ‘ideal and m ateria l interests’ in 
G erth , H .H . & Mills, C.W. (eds.), From M ax Weber: Essays in Sociology. New 
York, Oxford University Press, 1947 and W eber, M., T h e  Protestant E th ic  and the 
Spirit o f Capitalism. London, Allen & Unw in, 1930.
Steve D ’Alton is a lec tu re r in  sociology a t the  U niversity of NSW.
37
of the beliefs themselves, rather they are treated as social facts 
and a part of the total social context. On the individual level this 
approach is characterised by the concept formation notions ex­
pressed by Piaget. Piaget2 holds that the child stamps his spontaneous 
concepts with his own personality and has his non-spontaneous 
concepts affected by adults. Again the use to which these concepts 
are put or the nature of the input is not ethically questioned.
These approaches view the organisation of beliefs about reality 
as ends in themselves for study, they pass no judgements in relation 
to the congruence between perceived reality and ‘absolute’ reality. 
It is a relativistically oriented study which seeks to explain human 
action within its own relative frame. Barnes takes this ethically 
neutral system to its extreme, stating that “an ideology is a belief 
system that is internally consistent and consciously held”."
Marx4 is the major proponent of the second orientation, an 
orientation which states that reality is knowable but ideology is a 
purposive distortion of this reality. This concept of ideology is 
based on an interest theory of social action which states that the 
context is not neutral but responsive to a particular formulation 
of reality ordered and organised by a particular dominant interest 
group.
From this viewpoint the expression of a total reality is ordered 
by reference to a partial reality which masquerades as the total 
and serves to organise reality through a pre-existent frame. Lefebvre5 
suggests six characteristics of this conception. Firstly ideologies 
start in fragmentary, partial reality; they refract (not reflect) reality 
via pre-existing representations, that is in ‘acceptable form’; ideolo­
gies distort praxis by constructing an abstract, unreal, fictitious 
theory of the whole; ideologies are (a) general, speculative and 
abstract (b) they represent determinate, limited and special interests; 
they have some basis in reality but can only be evaluated post 
facto; finally in this view ideologies mediate between praxis and
Effectively, the partial reality provides the meaning framework 
within which all new information (in fact all information) is filtered
-  Piaget, ]., T h e  Psychology o f In telligence  (trans. Piercy & Berlyne). London 
R outledge and Kegan Paul, 1950.
Barnes, S.H., “Ideology and the organization of conflict: on the  relationship  
between political th ough t and behaviour”. Journal of Politics, 1966, Vol. 28, pp  
513-530.
* T h e  concept of ideology is found in m ost of M arx’s works; a good exposition 
however, can be found in M arx, K. & Engels, F., T h e  German Ideology Parts I & 
III) (trans. R. Pascal), New York, In tern a tio n a l Publishers Co., 1947.
•"> Lefebvre, H ., T h e  Sociology o f M arx. London, Allen Lane the  Penguin  Press, 
1968. Ch. 3. pp . 59-88.
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and ordered. Ideology is thus the context, ordered and organised 
by a particular interest in the guise of general interest, of partial 
reality in the guise of total reality, a totalised totality that integrates 
meaning under a dominant and pervasive system. In this sense 
ideology is a reification, an extrapolation of a limited range of 
values from the total range, an investment of this chosen range 
with the qualities of the total and a resolving of the total as an 
expression of the partial. This view does not see ideology as unreal 
but sees it as the real expression of a biased or unreal content. 
Individuals and groups can experience reality within this limited 
context, thus ordering their perceptions of reality on the basis of an 
untrue and distorted frame.
Mannheim’s6 conceptual schema may be viewed as serving an 
integrative function which at once reorganises and broadens the 
total concept in such a way that both the above approaches are 
comprehended. Mannheim makes two distinctions within his approach 
to ideology. The anterior condition of all ideological expression is 
formulated as the ‘particular’ and ‘total’.7 Seen as a historically 
developing condition the particular relates to one idea within a 
total context of ideas while the general can be viewed as the 
total context itself.
This condition is seen by Mannheim to precede that of ‘specific’ 
and ‘general’ formulations of ideas in action.8 ‘Specific’ ideology 
relates to the ideality of a definite group, raised to the status of 
objective validity and seen by that group as the datum from which 
views of opponent groups may be assessed as distortions of this 
reality and consequently labelled ideologies. This view is seen by 
Mannheim to precede the recognition by all groups of the relativity, 
of their own reference frames. In this final phase, labelled ‘general’ 
by Mannheim, there is a reflexive recognition by each group that 
not only are its opponents’ views ideological but its own are open 
to the same construction.
If relativism is considered to be the total context, all formulations 
of the field hold equal validity in terms of the knowing subject, i.e. 
they are true for him. However, the subject is object for any 
other’s totalisation of the fields, so that the relationships within the 
field are unique to each subject. This means that there is no basis 
for reciprocal recognition of an identical field and every statement 
about the field by every subject within the field holds validity only
C> M annheim , K„ Ideology and Utopia: A n  In troduction  to the  Sociology of 
Knoioledge. London, R outledge & Kegan Paul, 1960, Ch. II , pp . 49-96.
7 Ibid., pp. 57-62.
s Ibid., pp. 67-74.
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in terms of the author of the statement. Consequently for explanatory 
purposes every explanation is of equal value, but this reduces the 
notion of explanation to idiosyncratic description. Each phenomenon 
is unique and therefore explanation is impossible.
So far relativism has been posed as the mutually exclusive 
alternative to absolutism. This separation is in the frame of Aristo­
telian logic and in these terms is not possible to resolve within 
itself. Resolution of this dilemma is only possible by recourse 
to an alternative form of reason— dialectical thinking. This pro­
vides a transcendent synthesis which retotalises both absolute and 
relative frames of reference within a new epistemology which is 
designed to avoid the rigidly oppositional thinking of the Aristo­
telian system.1' If the initial assumption is one of change rather 
than stasis then the law of identity does, not apply. From the 
assumption of change, reality must be viewed as in constant 
process, i.e. it is at all times, becoming other than it is. Consequently 
reality is seen as a becoming totality.
From this approach epistemology is concerned with the meaning 
of expressions —  the way expressions are ordered in their changing 
context.10 Each act of ordering the context in a particular way 
provides at once a partial and transitory formulation of reality. 
This act of ordering is a totalisation of the field in such a way as 
to invest it with particular meaning. Because of the basic assump­
tion that change is the condition of the environment, the particular 
totalisation is one moment which has no continuity —  the act of 
totalisation is at the same time providing the conditions for de­
totalisation and thus necessitating a retotalisation if meaning is to 
be continued. On the other hand, a totality is a finality, the 
process of which is frozen into a unitary, objective frame. Given 
that the basic assumption is change then a totality, is inevitably 
a distortion of process and a false representation of reality as 
object. This formulation of reality corresponds to Marx’s concepts 
of reification.11
Marx identifies reification as the result of a projection of
!* Korzybski has provided a  trenchan t criticism of A ristotelian th ink ing  in terms 
of its assum ption of stasis b u t stops short of suggesting the  dialectic as an a lte rn a ­
tive m ode of reasoning. Korzybski, A., Science and Sanity: A n  In troduction  to 
N on-A ristotelian Systems and General Semantics. 2nd Ed., Lancaster Pa., In te r­
national N on-A ristotelian Publish ing Co., 1941.
1<> T h is  notion  of epistemology is a synthesis of the  views of R ickm an and 
Sartre: R ickm an, H .P., U nderstanding and the  H um an  Studies. London, Heine- 
m ann E ducational Press, 1967. Laing, R.D. & Cooper, D.G., Reason and Violence: 
A Decade o f Sartre’s Philosophy 1950-1960. London, Tavistock, 1964.
11 T h e  following account of M arx’s notion  of ‘reification’ draws on Lefebvre, H. 
Op. Cit., pp . 48-49.
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object qualities onto what is essentially a voluntary human con­
struction. Thus categories are given the qualities of things; they 
become in-itself-others and are viewed as possessing individual 
existence beyond their construction. That is they are viewed as 
entities of themselves. From this point of view the notion of say, 
‘consumer’ is reified if the concept is invested with qualities that 
provide it with an existence of itself, divorced from the context 
of the category. ‘Consumer’ as a concept is essentially only the 
form that an abstracted series of qualities takes and is hypothetical 
construct. To then view the people who may be subsumed under 
this category as ‘consumers’ and to act towards them as inter­
changeable units, each a perfect substitute for the other, is to 
abstract the people and relate only to the category.
The whole concept of reification retains the implications of 
distortion which are characteristic of the Marxian notion. For the 
analysis of society it is necessary to retain the distortion component 
in any conception cf ‘ideology’. Weber, and those theorists who 
view ideology in an ethically neutral context, divest the concept 
of any explanatory power and reduce it to mere description 
of concept formation. From this point of view there is no necessity 
to have a concept of ideology at all.
In the Marxian tradition ideology is used to debunk alternative 
conceptions of reality in terms of their divergence from that 
definition of reality posed as objective within the Marxian frame. 
This necessitates an approach which assumes an objective reality 
which may be known and is based in an absolutist epistemology 
oriented towards the discovery of the truth. In effect this approach 
turns the concept of ‘truth’ into a reific object, with a particular 
formation being expressed as an absolute. Truth is regarded as 
timeless, independent of context, contained within itself, an absolute 
formulation of a static reality.1- As soon as the concept of ideology 
is introduced however, the ‘reality’ of all formulations must be 
assessed as ideological, thus introducing a relativistic content to 
the apparent absolutist frame. The Marxian reality may be assessed 
as a partial reality masquerading as total and consequently made 
to appear as an arbitrary choice in the same manner as any other 
ideology. This is an inherent problem in the traditional Marxian 
analysis of ideology. Weber’s approach may be justifiably criticised 
by Marxists as pure description while the Marxian approach may 
be criticised by Weberians as avoiding the inherent problem of 
relativism; consequently a new synthesis is required to transcend
12 M annheim  appears to have appreciated  this problem ; see M annheim , K., Op. 
Cit., pp. 70-71, and M annheim 's letter to  W olff in Gross, L. (ed.), Symposium  on 
Sociological Theory. New York, H arp er & Row, 1959, pp. 571-572.
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both these problems.'"
With an epistemology that is concerned with meaning (i.e. the 
subjective context placed on object formations by an active other) 
relativism is built into the framework and both the absolute and 
relative context are apprehended as constituents of one becoming* 
reality. This formulation also includes the assumption of change 
as the systematic context of social reality. In terms of meaning there 
is no single timeless reality: it is the apprehension of an object’s 
expression in a context which invests the object with meaning. An 
epistemology concerned with this has relativism at its basis; that 
is, it is concerned with the definition of an object via its relation 
to a particular context— the way in which meaning is ascribed.
Taking this view of epistemology, it is still possible to analyse 
society within the framework of ideology as distortion. Thus while 
relativism is retained, the analytic value of the concept of ideology 
has not been sacrificed. Ideology may be viewed as reification —  
which is the static principle of order through which all information 
is processed —  so that a partial formulation of reality is raised 
to the status of an eternal comprehensive system. Reality takes the 
form of totalisation, detotalisation and retotalisation where the 
knowing subject actively comprehends his environment by project­
ing a system of order. In effect the author invests the external 
environment w;th a subjective condition and at the same time 
re-.introjects this project as understanding. This operates to provide 
a context of meaning whereby the subject ascribes external objects 
with particular values and orders the perceived field in terms of 
th? relationships of these values as a method of comprehension. 
This process involves, activity on the part of the knowing subject 
who thus totalises his field. At the same time this particular 
ordering, of the field adds a new element to the field —  the 
pro'ected meaning —  and consequently a new integration of the 
field is required. This is the process of detotalisation which neces­
sitates retotalisation. Thus totalisation, detotalisation and retotali­
sation are inextricable moments of a single praxis and underly the 
concept of the becoming nature of reality.
Ideology is a denial of the becoming nature of reality and is the 
imposition of a single static framework which is a totality that 
freezes the process of totalisation, detotalisation and retotalisation. 
Being a static reality, ideology distorts the real process.
l-'t From  th e  references above it is clear th a t M annheim  was aware of the  validity 
of these counter-criticism s and unsuccessfully a ttem pted  synthesis of the  two 
schools. W hile  he  recognized the  need for a fram e of reference w ith in-built 
propensity  for change, he never employed such a fram e nor d id  he  realise its 
full im plications.
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